



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

**PUBLIC COPY**

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS  
425 Eye Street N.W.  
ULLB, 3rd Floor  
Washington, D.C. 20536

**JAN 08 2003**

FILE

Office: Los Angeles

Date:

IN RE: Applicant:

APPLICATION:

Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility under  
Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1182(i)

IN BEHALF OF APPLICANT:

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,  
EXAMINATIONS

Robert P. Wiemann, Director  
Administrative Appeals Office

**Identifying data deleted to  
prevent clearly unwarranted  
invasion of personal privacy**

**DISCUSSION:** The waiver application was denied by the District Director, Los Angeles, California, and is now before the Associate Commissioner for Examinations on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who procured admission into the United States in 1986 by falsely claiming to be a United States citizen. Therefore, she is inadmissible to the United States under section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), for having procured admission into the United States by fraud or willful misrepresentation. The applicant is the beneficiary of an approved Petition for Alien Relative as the unmarried daughter of a lawful permanent resident. The applicant seeks the above waiver in order to remain in the United States.

The district director concluded that the applicant had failed to establish that extreme hardship would be imposed on a qualifying relative and denied the application accordingly.

On appeal, counsel states that the applicant has not committed fraud as she entered the United States without inspection. Counsel states that the applicant's written statement was an indication of a plan for her entry to the United States, not what actually happened.

Counsel further states that, assuming arguendo the applicant has committed fraud, the waiver should be granted when the favorable factors outweigh the unfavorable ones. Counsel then cites Matter of Alonzo, 17 I&N Dec. 292 (Comm. 1979), and Matter of Da Silva, 17 I&N Dec. 288 (Comm. 1979).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, 22 I&N Dec. 560 (BIA 1999), the Board held that the underlying fraud or misrepresentation may be considered as an adverse factor in adjudicating a section 212(i) waiver application in the exercise of discretion. Matter of Tijam, 22 I&N 408 (BIA 1998), followed. The Board declined to follow the policy set forth by the Commissioner in Matter of Alonso; Matter of Da Silva, and noted that the United States Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996), that the Attorney General has the authority to consider any and all negative factors, including the respondent's initial fraud. In Matter of Tijam, p.416, the Service contended that as a matter of policy it has decided to withdraw from Matter of Alonzo. In its supplemental brief on appeal, the Service states that it "will hereinafter consider an alien's entry fraud as an adverse factor in determining whether an alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion. The Associate Commissioner is bound by that decision.

On appeal, counsel submits statements from the applicant's mother who states that she and the applicant moved from the Los Angeles area to Sacramento because of the applicant's work. There is also a statement from the applicant's brother, who resided with the applicant and her mother when the application was filed in August

1997. The applicant's brother states that he still lives in Los Angeles with his common-law wife and their two children. The applicant contends that only she can help and assist her mother with her daily needs.

It is noted that the 1997 application also lists a sister, Sonia, with an address in Sacramento. The record is silent regarding Sonia's ability to assist her mother now that they both live in Sacramento. The applicant also stated on June 4, 1998, that she has three siblings (two lawful permanent residents and one U.S. citizen) in the United States. The record only discusses two of those three siblings.

The record contains a statement by the applicant, in Spanish, dated July 23, 1997, in which she states that, (in) "1986 I entered through the line (border) Tijuana, B.C. and told them that I was a U.S. citizen." ("1986 entre por la linea (border) Tijuana, B.C. y le dije que era U.S. citizen.") The key part of that statement is "I told him/her" (le dije). When aliens enter without inspection they do not tell anyone anything. The implication of her assertion is that she told "an officer" that she was a U.S. citizen.

Section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act provides, in part, that:

(i) Any alien who, by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other benefit provided under this Act is inadmissible.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that:

(1) The Attorney General may, in the discretion of the Attorney General, waive the application of clause (i) of subsection (a)(6)(C) in the case of an alien who is the spouse, son or daughter of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, if it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the refusal of admission to the United States of such immigrant alien would result in extreme hardship to the citizen or lawfully resident spouse or parent of such an alien.

(2) No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision or action of the Attorney General regarding a waiver under paragraph (1).

Sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(i) of the Act were amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009. There is no longer any alternative provision for waiver of a section 212(a)(6)(C)(i) violation due to passage of time. Nothing could be clearer than Congress' desire in recent years to limit, rather than extend, the relief available to aliens who have committed fraud or

misrepresentation. Congress has almost unfettered power to decide which aliens may come to and remain in this country. This power has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). See also Matter of Yeung, 21 I&N Dec. 610, 612 (BIA 1997).

Congress has increased the penalties on fraud and willful misrepresentation, including the narrowing of the parameters for eligibility, the re-inclusion of the perpetual bar and eliminating children as a consideration in determining the presence of extreme hardship. Congress has placed a high priority on reducing and/or stopping fraud and misrepresentation related to immigration and other matters.

Section 212(i) of the Act provides that a waiver of the bar to admission resulting from section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Act is dependent first upon a showing that the bar imposes an extreme hardship on a qualifying family member. Although extreme hardship is a requirement for section 212(i) relief, once established, it is but one favorable discretionary factor to be considered. See Matter of Mendez, 21 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 1996).

In Matter of Cervantes-Gonzalez, , the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) stipulated that the factors deemed relevant in determining whether an alien has established extreme hardship pursuant to section 212(i) of the Act include, but are not limited to, the following: the presence of a lawful permanent resident or United States citizen spouse or parent in this country; the qualifying relative's family ties outside the United States; the conditions in the country or countries to which the qualifying relative would relocate and the extent of the qualifying relative's ties in such countries; the financial impact of departure from this country; and finally, significant conditions of health, particularly when tied to an unavailability of suitable medical care in the country to which the qualifying relative would relocate.

Although the applicant alleges financial hardship to her mother in this matter, the BIA referred to Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 1994), in which the court stated that the "extreme hardship requirement of section 212(h)(2) of the Act was not enacted to insure that the family members of excludable aliens fulfill their dreams or continue in the lives which they currently enjoy."

The court held in INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981), that the mere showing of economic detriment to qualifying family members is insufficient to warrant a finding of extreme hardship.

The record is devoid of financial records relating to the applicant's mother, other than the fact that the mother lives with the applicant. The record fails to contain reasons why Sonia is unable to assist the mother and there is nothing in the record regarding the third sibling.

A review of the documentation in the record, when considered in its totality, reflects that the applicant has failed to show that the qualifying relative would suffer extreme hardship over and above the normal economic and social disruptions involved in the removal of a family member. Having found the applicant statutorily ineligible for relief, no purpose would be served in discussing whether the applicant merits a waiver as a matter of discretion.

In proceedings for application for waiver of grounds of inadmissibility under section 212(i) of the Act, the burden of proving eligibility remains entirely with the applicant. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. Here, the applicant has not met that burden. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.

**ORDER:** The appeal is dismissed.